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No Gain at Death
In the context of an installment sale,
gain is not trigg ered by the granto r 's deathand the IRD regime is not applicable

n a 2002 article, ' we examined at length the incometax effects of the termination of a grantor trust by
reason of the death of the grantor in the context of
an installment sale.' Acknowledging then that the law
was unsettled, we considered the plausibility of various
approaches. Still, we reached firm conclusions about two
critical issues: first, that gain is not recognized at the time
of the grantor's death; and second, that the income in
respect of a decedent (IRD) regime, largely contained in
Internal Revenue Code Section 691 , cannot apply.
We continue to believe that these conclusions are
correct.

I

No Gain at Death
We start by noting that even the Internal Revenue
Service has now informally agreed with our first conclusion: death does not trigger gain.
In Chief Counsel Advice 200923024, the Service,
analyzing a tax-shelter-type transaction, reviewed what
it called the primary authorities on the cessation of
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grantor trust status.' In each of these authorities, it was
determined that, when grantor trust status ended during the grantor's Lifetime, gain was recognized on the
rationale that the encumbering Liability exceeded the
basis in the asset that, until cessation, was deemed to be
owned by the grantor.' This determination is nothing
more than a corollary to the now well-accepted notion
that the gift of an asset can trigger gain when the asset is
encumbered by a Liability that exceeds basis' -which is
a narrow exception to the general rule that a donor does
not recognize gain when gifting an asset.
Most significant, after reviewing the cited authorities,
the Service concludes in the CCA that these authorities
apply only in the inter vivos setting and not when grantor trust status ends by reason of the grantor's death.
Acknowledging the inveterate principle that death cannot trigger gain and that this principle is to be applied
when the grantor of a grantor trust dies, the Service
states: "We would also note that the rule set forth in
these authorities is narrow, insofar as it only affects inter
vivos lapses of grantor trust status, not that caused by
the death of the owner which is generally not treated as
an income tax event." (Emphasis added. )
As we indicated in 2002, we beUeve-that this no-gainat-death rule can be. traced back to the Supreme Court's
1947 decision in Crane v. Commissioner! In Crane, the
decedent's asset had been encumbered by a Liability. The
court, applying the predecessor of IRC Section 1014,
determined that the legatee's basis was equal to the
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asset's fair market value (FMV) on the date of death,
undiminished by the amount of the encumbering debt.'
While the court did not explicitly address the decedent's
income tax consequence, it in1plicitly viewed the decedent as not having made a sale to the legatee at the time
of death. For, if the court had taken the view that a sale
had occurred, the legatee would have necessarily been
treated as having made a purchase, in which case her
basis would have been determined under the predecessor of Section 1012. Thus, i11 applying Section 1014 in
ilie determination of ilie legatee's basis, the court implicitly treated ilie decedent as not having made a sale.
As a result, it is quite clear that, as we stated earlier,
a person who dies with an asset that is encumbered
by a liability in excess of the asset's basis does not
recognize gain.
In contrast, a person making an inter vivos gift of a
liability-in-excess-of-basis asset would recognize gain.8
While some might find this distinction between inter
vivos and testamentary transfers unsatisfying, it is a wellaccepted one. We continue to believe that the distinction
does make sense: While a failure to recognize gain in ilie
case of an inter vivos transfer of a liability-in-excessof-basis asset could lead to taxpayer abuse, iliere is no
potential for such ab use in the case of a testamentary
transfer inasmuch as taxpayers can only take advantage
of ilie no-gain-at-death rule by dying.
Thus, we must reject any suggestion iliat, under
the authorities cited in the CCA, cessation of grantor
trust status by reason of the grantor's death should be
treated as a sale that triggers gain-as acknowledged
by the recent CCA.
While the in1pulse to treat the testan1entary and inter
vivos transfer of a liability-in-excess-of-basis asset in
ilie same fashion is understandable, ilie deeper understanding one acquires in tracing the treatment of such
testamentary transfers back to Crane illuminates why the
impulse is wrong. Indeed, ignoring this distinction would
lead one, by necessity, to conclude that the decedent in
Crane had recognized gain at the time of death (assuming
ilie encumbering liability exceeded the decedent's basis).
And no one has ever uggested uch a result would be
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appropriate9- not even, as the CCA reflects, the Service. 10
This is not to say, however, that Crane itself dictates
the treatment of the termination of grantor trust status
at ilie grantor's deaili. To be sure, ilie decedent in Crane
had never transferred the asset to a grantor trust. But
once Revenue Ruling 85-13 is taken into account, it
becomes clear tl1at a grantor is deemed to own the assets
in the trust for all income tax purposes throughout his
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entire lifetime (where grantor trust status is not turned
off prior to deaili.) And if ilie grantor is treated as owning ilie asset, gain cannot be recognized at death-just as
gain is not recognized at deaili in the case of an asset that
tl1e decedent had owned outright. Thus, we continue to
hold that the combined effect of the no-gain-at-death
rule and ilie principle in Rev. Rul. 85-13 iliat tl1e grantor
is deemed to own the trust's assets precludes ilie recognition of gain at ilie grantor's deaili.
We have written several other observations supporting our no-gain -at-death conclusion. Aliliough
we do not want to repeat iliem here, we briefly mention one for the reader's convenience: In the preamble
to ilie final regulations under IRC Section 684, the
Treasury acknowledges that, as a general rule, no gain
is recognized at the death of the grantor of a grantor
trust. It then goes on to justify a narrow exception for
foreign trusts, claiming that the language of the IRC
m akes it appropriate (specifically, Sections 684, 679
and 6048(a)(3)(A)(ii)). But it is important to emphasize iliat, in doing so, the Treasury did not abandon
the general rule that cessation of grantor trust status
at death does not trigger gain. "
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IRD Cann o t Appl y
We also explained in our earlier article that, because the
grantor is deemed to own the trust's assets throughout
his lifetime, the IRD regime cannot apply. In other words,
when a sale is not deemed to occur before the decedent's
death, gain cannot be treated as IRD. We cited Treasury
Regulations Section l.69l(a)-2 (b), Example 4, which
deals with a buy-sell agreement. The example concludes
that the sale under such an agreement cannot trigger
IRD because the sale becomes effective only upon the
decedent's death.
1
It has been suggested that we misread this example.
Under this view, completion of the buy-sell agreement
did not result in IRD because the sale was consummated
after the decedent's death. " But this understanding of
the example is incorrect. To support our understanding,
we cited Estate of Peterson v. Comm'r 13 in which the Tax
Court cites the example to demonstrate the principle
that a sale that becomes effective upon the decedent's
death cannot result in IRD. The court stated: "This situation may be best exemplified by a typical date-of-death
buy-sell agreement between a decedent and his corporation; since, by its terms, the sale is only effective upon the
decedent's death, the decedent could not have received
the sale proceeds if he had lived. Therefore, the proceeds
from such a sale are not income in respect of a decedent.
See sec. l.69l(a)-2(b) (example (4)) , Income Tax Regs."
(Emphasis added.)" Thus, suggestions that the example
should be read as ruling out IRD on the ground that the
sale becomes effective after death is inconsistent with the
reading the Tax Court gave the example in Peterson.
Applying this principle in the context of an install- ,
ment sale to a grantor trust, we previously concluded
that, because the grantor is deemed to own the assets
in the trust until death, the IRD regime cannot apply.
In short, any sale that is deemed to occur upon the
decedent's death or thereafter cannot generate IRD. We
continue to believe that conclusion is correct. "
There is even a more fundamental reason why the
IRD regime cannot apply. IRD is tax income to which
the decedent was entitled before death but which was
1
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not properly reportable on a pre-death return.'6 On
account of Rev. Rul. 85-13, there is no sale during the
decedent's lifetime; concomitantly, there is no note outstanding during the decedent's lifetime and no interest
due, accrued or imputed during the decedent's lifetime,
for income tax purposes. Hence, a decedent could never
ffi
have had an entitlement that would trigger IRD.'7

Endnotes
1. See Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Mitchell M. Gans and Hugh M. Jacobson, "Income
Tax Effects of Termination of Grantor Trust Status by Reason of the Grantor's
Death," 97 Journal of Taxation 149 (2002)
2. The issue arises when the outstanding balance on the note at the time of the
grantor's death is greater than the grantor's pre-death basis in the trust's
assets.
3. These are the authorities to which Chief Counsel Advice 200923024 refers:
Treasury Regulations Section 1.1001-2(c). Example 5(treating the cessation of
grantor trust status during the lifetime of the grantor as again-recognition
event. by reason of Section 752, because the trust owned apartnership interest in whicllliabilities exceeded outside basis); Madorin v. Commissioner.
84 T.C. 667 (1985) (applying and upholding Example 5 in Treas. Regs. Section 1.1001-2(c)); and Revenue Ruling 77-402, 1977-2 C.B. 222.
4. See Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B.I84 (holding that the grantor of agrantor trust is
deemed to own the assets in the trust as long as it remains agrantor trust).
5. See Diedric/J v. Commissioner. 457 U.S 191 (1982).
6. Crane v. Comm 'r, 331 U.S. 1(1947).
7. Some commentators misunderstand Crane, conceptualizing it as permitting the
inclusion of the encumbering liability in basis. This misunderstanding may be
attributable to a visceral sense that Crane treated the legatee as a purchaser
and the decedent as aseller. Properly understood, the court's holding fixes the
legatee's basis, under the predecessor of Internal Revenue Code Section 1014, at
the fair market value of the asset on the date of death. The legatee is not treated
as apurchaser. and the decedent is not treated as aseller. Rather, the legatee is
treated for purposes of Section 1014 as an inheritor. In adopting this approach, the
court rejected the argument that the legatee's basis should be equal to the value
of the asset's net equity. Instead. the court held that the amount of tile liability is
irrelevant in the determination of basis. It is worth noting, however, that the court
did not elaborate on the determination of basis when the encumbering liability
exceeds the asset's value. It may well be that, in sucl1 acase, the legatee's basis
would be zero. See Mitchell M. Gans. "Re-Examining the Sham Doctrine: When
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Should an Overpayment Be Reflected in Basis?" 30 Buff L. Rev. 95 (1981) But, of
course, 1f one conceptualizes Crane as permitting encumbering liabilities to be
1ncluded 111 basis, he might fail to appreciate the zero-basis possibility.
8. See D1edrtch v. Comm'r, supra note 5.
9. See. for example. H. R. No. 107-84, 107th Cong., 1st Session 113 (2001) ("The bill
clarifies that gam is not recognized at the time of death when the estate or
he1r acqu1res from the decedent property subject to aliability that is greater
than the decedent's basis 111 the property.")
10. Similarly. anyone ignonng th1s d1st1nct1on would have to conclude that. when
a liab111ty-in-excess-of-bas1s asset 1s held 111 a revocable trust. the grantor
would have to recogn1ze gain at death. Agam, that IS a result that no one
would endorse.
II. In our prev1ous article. we also d1scussed the trustee's bas1s. We reviewed
alternative approacl1es to the question. Under one of the approaches we
discussed, the trustee's bas1s would be determined under IRC Section 1014
once the grantor has died. We suggested that. even though the trust's
assets are excluded from the grantor's gross estate. this might be the
correct outcome g1ven Revenue Ruling 85-13. In other words. if we are to
engage fully in the fict1on that the grantor continues to own the assets for
allmcome tax purposes as long as grantor trust status remams mlact, it
would seem that the property 111 the trust IS bequeathed by tile decedent
and should therefore qualify for Section1014 treatment by reason of Seclion 1014(b)(l). We. of course, recognized the counterintuitive nature of permilling astep up under Sect1on 1014 for an asset not mcluded in the gross
estate, but we thought it flowed from the fict1on adopted 111 Rev. Rul. 85-13:
that. for all income tax purposes. including presumably Section 1014, the
assets in agrantor trust should be treated as owned by the grantor. Once
thiS fiction IS accepted. 1t would seem tl1at any asset remaming in agrantor
trust until the grantor's death should be treated as owned by the grantor
unt1l deatll and therefore bequeathed by the grantor at the t1me of deaththus tnggering Section 1014(b)(l). This fiction IS analogous to Treas. Regs.
Section 11001-2(c), Example 5, under which the grantor of a grantor trust
IS treated for mcome tax purposes as having made an inter vivos gift of a
partnership interest held 111 the trust when grantor trust status term1nates
dunng the grantor's l1fet1me.ln any event. the Serv1ce recently rejected th1s
argument In CCA 200937028. Without Cltmg Rev. Rul. 85-13 or cons1denng
the possibility that tl1e grantor should be deemed to own the asset unt1l
death. the Service simply concludes that Section 1014(b)(l)-which prov1des
astep up for assets bequeathed by the decedent-does not apply. It then
concludes tl1at Sect1on 1014 cannot apply unless the asset IS Included in the
decedent's gross estate.
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12. It should be noted that the termmat1on of the grantor's life as an mcome
taxpayer and the commencement of the existence of the decedent's estate tax as an income taxpayer do not support the notion that the inherent gamm the assets held in the trust IS income in respect of adecedent
(IRD), because the commencement of the existence of the decedent's
estate begms the day after the decedent's date of death. In fact, the
dale of the decedent's death is the first day of the estate's first tax year.
See Rev. Rul. 69-563, 1969-2 C.B. 104. This rul1ng was declared obsolete
by T.D. 8996, but not for the proposition cited. See also General Counsel
Memoranda 38960 that states: "The moment of death determines the
end of the decedent's tax year and the beg1nnmg of the estate's tax
year."
13. Estate of Peterson v. Comm'r. 74 T.C. 630 (1980), aff'd 667 F.2d 675 (8th Cir.
1981)
14. lb1d, at p. 641.
15. Frane v. Comm'r, 998 F.2d 567 (8th Clr. 1993), does not suggest otherw1se. As
we d1scussed 111 our pnor artiCle. the decedent in Frane had elected installment reporting at the time of the sale. As a result. cancellation of t11e note
triggered IRD pursuant to Sections 453B(f) and 691(a)(5)(ili). In the case of a
sale to agrantor trust, in contrast, no such election is made or could be made
given Rev. Rul. 85-13.1ndeed, if these sections have any relevance. 1t is in the1r
Implication that, as ageneral matter. there IS no gam at death absent aspecific provision to the contrary (such as Sections 453B(f) or 684).
16. See Peterson. supra note 13 at p. 638; Treas. Regs. Section 1.691(a)-l(b) ("In
general, the term 'income in respect of adecedent' refers to those amounts to
wh1ch adecedent was entitled as gross income but which were not properly
1nclud1ble in comput1ng l11s taxable mcome for the taxable year endmg with
the date of h1s death or for aprev1ous taxable year under the method of accounting employed by the decedent")
17.1n CCA 200937028, the Service 1tself appears to agree that the IRD regime
cannot apply 111 th1s context The IRS states: "Based on my reading of the statute and the regulations. 1t would seem that t11e general rule IS that property
transferred prior to death. even to a grantor trust. would not be subject to
section 1014. unless the property IS included 111 the gross estate for federal
estate tax purposes as per section 1014(b)(9)" If tile IRD regime were applicable. Section 1014 could not apply, even if 1t were mcluded in the gross estate.
See Sect1on 1014(c). In effect. Section 1014 treatment and the IRD regime are
mutually exclus1ve. Thus, 111 suggesting that an asset sold to agrantor trust
could qualify for treatment under Section 1014 (assuming it were included in
the gross estate), the Serv1ce in effect concedes thalllle IRD regime can have
no application 111 th1s context.
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